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A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF SCIENCE
James Sla ck
Department of Biology
Viterbo College
La O-osse, WI 54601
It would seem to be a rat her simple matter to defin e what science is and
how it operates. After all , a goo d portion of ou r high scho ol and coll ege
ca ree rs have been spent in science classrooms and lab oratories. Possible
answers mi ght be th at sc ience is an orga nized body of knowledge and that it
operates by discove ri ng th e t ruth abo ut nat ure throu gh the use of sc ientifi c
method . It see ms equall y sim ple to visuali ze science as a ma ssive pil e of bri cks
with eac h scientist addin g a new brick each time he discove rs a new fact or
invents a new theo ry. Further, if one has eve r take n the time to rea d the
history of a disciplin e in a textbook. the pi ct ure portrayed is one of a stea dy
prog ression in a logica l and straigh tforward manner from ignorance to
present-day truth . Probab ly mos t of us view sc ience in such a way.

This paper will attempt to give a different view of what science is and how
it operntes. Thi s other view o f sc ience is based on the premise that without
inst rumentat ion , man is li mite d in what he can "know" because he is limited
in what his senses perce ive, (Only certa in phenomena are detected by ma n's
senso ry receptors) For exam ple, onl y a small portion of elec tromagn eti c
rad iation (visibl e li ght) is detec table by man 's eyes . In addition, there are
phenomena that man does not perce ive at all , such as magnet ic pull , gravity
and atomic radiati on. There ma y be, and mos t likely are, other phenomena
that exist in nat ure of which we are completely un awa re. These unknown
phenomena may be as important or mo re imp ortant in determinin g and
shapin g our ex istence . Because man is limi ted in what his senses perceive, he
will probabl y never know ultima te reality (the way nature really is).
What then does science study? Science stud ies those judgments
(in fere nces ) about our sense percepti ons upon which uni ve rsa l ag reement can
be at tain ed . In prac tice , scientists do not use this idea li zed proce dure for
determining what science wi ll study . Scientists use another screening
techniqu e, that is, th ey use laws. Laws are in variab le associations between
two objects or events (for exa mpl e; gases ex pand when heated). Regardless of
which sc ree ning technique is use d, th e sa me objects or event s are adm itted
into sc ience for study.

What is Science?
Th e definiti on of science (or what sc ience is) is different from what the
subj ec t matter of science is. Science can be divid ed into two leve ls, an
empirical leve l and a theoretical level. Th e empirical level deals only with
"observables" (for exa mple ; rabbits, sta rs, bacteria). The activities of the
empirical leve l include ob serv ation , class ifi cation , data . collection and
experimentation. Such act ivities culminat e in the discovery of laws. Laws
se rve as both a start in g point of scienc e (subject matter) and as a final
pr odu ct of science.
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The theo reti ca l leve l of science dea ls with non-obse rvables (for exa mpl e;
atoms , orbits of plan ets). The act ivities in clud e th e invention of theo ri es and
the empirical verification of predi ctions made from theories . Campbe ll ( l)
defines a theory as a system of ge neral and abstract statements capable of: (i)
"ex plaining" , (ii) summarizin g a body of ex isting laws , and (iii ) forming
new laws. The part of science that re main s and continu es to be expanded
upon are it s laws. Sin ce man is limited in what his senses perceive, the
theo ries that he invent s to ex plain phenomena may not represe nt ultimate
reality. Theo ri es are th e part of science that chan ge; that is , theories are
continually being revised With a better understa ndin g of what laws and theories are, we ca n now
find out more about science and how it operates .
Thomas S. Kuhn (2), a philosopher of sc ience, believes that th e patt e rn of
a mature sc ience is one of success ive transit ion from one paradigm to another
via revolutions. A paradigm is defin ed as any achievement that : (i) gu id es the
resea rch of a disciplin e; and (ii) attracts an enduring group of scientists away
from competing modes of sc ientifi c thought. Theo ries can be paradigms as
well as anything else, if they sa tisfy the above two criteria.
The period durin g which one paradigm is replaced by another is ca ll ed a
revo lutionary period. A revo lutionary period in sc ience is somewh at
analogou s to a political revolution. " Political revolutions are inaugurated by a
growing sense, often restri cted to a segment of the politi ca l co mmunity , that
existing institutions have adequate ly cease d to meet the probl ems posed by
an environment that th ey in part created" (2 , p. 92). This is also true of
scientific revolution s. Scientific revoluti ons are inaugurat ed by a growing
awaren ess that the ex istin g paradi gm is no longer adequately ex plaining newly
discovered phenomena. Today , most of us are not aware of past scientific
revolutions because the problems and soluti ons of early scientists are viewed
from the paradigms of today. However, th ey were period s of great turmoil. A
classic exa mple was the overthrow of the paradigm that viewed the earth as
the ce nter o f the universe. This revoluti onary period was not confined to the
scientific co mmunit y but affected man y facets of society.

Conclusion
The normal pattern of science then is for th e o ld paradi gm (theory) to be
replace d in whol e or in part by a new and in co mpatibl e paradigm. The new
paradigm causes a re-evaluation of prior face and a shift in th e problems
available for in vest igation .
With this introduction , we can now trace the history of a di sciplin e (for
examp le; mi crobiology) from a more philosophica l point of view. In doi ng so ,
the hi story ofa disciplin e becomes more dynami c.
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